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又一个家伙被干掉，正如英国女皇乐队的歌所说的。周三，随着宪法法院驳回英叻看守总理的职务，由于司法干预，泰国在六年内已目睹了三位亲达信的总理被干掉了。就在她被解职的那一刻，为泰党晋升尼瓦探隆为总理 - 达信的亲密伙伴——几乎就像要让他上刑场。
不出所料，反政府运动背后的知识份子，人民民主改革委员会宣布，尼瓦探隆不能成为看守首相，而只能是副首相代理看守首相一职。这个有争议性的论点意思是要表明存在一个政治真空，允许建立一个过度时期的政府，也就是所谓的人民议会。这很可能是反达信阵营又一次重复女皇乐队的歌词：〝嘿，我也会干掉你。又一个家伙被干掉了。〞
泰国宪法法庭撒除英叻首相职位，被政府的支持者视为是一个阴谋。其实不然。她明知或罔顾调走国家安全理事会的首长，让政府能够将时任的警察总长调任这个职位，然后允许达信的前任小舅子担任这个空置的国家警察总长的职位。星期二国家反贪污委员会就失败的稻米津贴计划而对英叻的失职的弹劾也不能说是一个阴谋，因为关於这个计划早已有很多警告的迹象。彈劾可能被证明是错误的，但它不是一个阴谋。
在这些判决上没有阴谋；它们完全遵循2007年宪法，目的在於牽制达信集团。它也是因应后2006年复兴的军人官僚机构与混合自由保守民主党的政治阶级之间的结盟以反对达信而建立的。它并没有成功。在2007年宪法下，达信支持的政党赢了两次大选〔2007年及2011年〕，然后在2014年2月又被宪法法庭宣判大选无效。这个判决是有道理的，因为这次的选举受到人民民主改革委员会的破坏与阻挠。
这其中没有阴谋，因为国家的独立机构，包括宪法法庭和选举局及其他，完全根据2007年宪法计划而运作。这包括加强独立机构与参议院在司法与官僚制度上的运作，并安排反达信力量的人士在这些机构里。希望这些手段能够控制那些倾向达信的政治阶级及其选举的基层。没必要给予没有阴谋这个词一个真正的含意，因为这些机构都是照章行事的。
这并不是说这些判决一定是合法的。2007年宪法赢得的准合法性，是在军人政府有限制的条件之下举行的全民公投中以勉强的多数票通过的。它真正产生的原因是基於2006年的非法政变：一个刑事法上被禁止的行为，但这个行为却被军人政府利用临时宪法，以由来已久的姿态概括承受了。基於他们这种动辄对政变的依靠，法律话语的规则在泰国，被反政府的精英当作反看守政府的一个主要的动力，这是有一点虚伪的味道。
它也是一种绝望的氛围。在1990年代时期，当一个自由保守的集团组成与制定了1997年宪法，民主党与公民社团大体上都没尽力去赢得新政治秩序与规范之下的国家治理权，这些新政治秩序与规范原本将可保护他们，以对抗2000年代前半期达信的威权选举体制。达信以政党的机器和有效的政策与行动，以及一些金钱上的滑润剂，赢得了选举。但由於走专制捷径与那些反对他的人的操纵，他现在在很多人的眼里，如果不是一个民主人物，至少是一个选举达人。
有人希望通过适当的基层工作，达信可能从流亡返国。因此，当英叻政府在去年年底尝试宪法改革之际，非常刻意地在改革的更高目标上，配搭了一个大赦，让达信可以返国。这带出了捣蛋的精灵 - 让她在位前两年政治上的相安无事分崩离析。
民主党前任秘书长素贴，与其他高调的民主党人士，辞去党要职位，走上街头斗争，接着在去年十二月，民主党的议员集体退出国会。木已成舟。泰国最老的政党，在某个时候，有着反独裁的光荣历史，鼓吹民主自由的形式，现在却一变而成为街头斗爭的形象，剥夺了国家政治妥协的机会，因为它选择不当一个强大的反对党。因此2007年这个透明的政治改革计划〔不是一个阴谋〕还在持续中。
如果没有阴谋，那么在执行各个法庭的案件以及它们达致的判决，肯定会有〝双重标准〞。但对於这些〝双重标准〞的控诉，横跨政治分歧的两个阵营之间，因为它们都有这种倾向，这由它们各自控制的机构采取的手段可见一斑。
双重标准无论谁执政都在玩。这反映出一个明显的棘手问题的两个层面：第一个，在想要政权的敌对双方的精英之间；第二个，在他们吸引广大群众所奉行的政治愿景之上。这个棘手问题，本身已是一件坏事，却因环绕在王室继承问题上的担忧而更纠结不清。
这个周末，双方的大批人马将走上街头。人民民主改革委员会寻求政府官员的倒戈，并成立一个过度时期的政府。他们占领电视台就是要向群众广播他们的这个意图。反独裁民主联盟将推动七月的大选，与继续留任看守政府。
前者完全没有希望，后者可能有一些希望。
反独裁民主联盟会说宪法法庭本身是不合宪法的。他们辩说它的功能没有组织法。2007年宪法必须在一年之内颁布一个组织法。没有组织法的存在，宪法法庭的合法性是基於2006政变而制定的一个临时条款上。反独裁民主联盟的一个问题是，宪法法庭的判決是最后的判决，不得上诉。因此，它现在只好走上街头保卫政府。
自从2006年政变，泰国就缺乏一个可行的政治解决办法，双方都在爭取对自己有利的，因此暴力与仇恨加剧。内战之说以往常被当作无稽之谈，现在却是大有可能。双方的武装冲突迫在眉头，很可能孤注一掷，邀来军队的干预。
但是，双方的建议并没有针对冲突的棘手性质。选举的权力现在看来，似乎只会导致灾难。选举并不是解决双方对权力基本矛盾的一个办法。为泰党的看守政府寻求另一次的民主委任权是没有意义的。真的，在泰国，每赢得一次选举，就好像经济学上说的〝报酬递减〞。
较好的选项是开始一个全民政治改革的程序。但这只能基於尊重现行看守政府在几次的选举中赢得的历史性民主意愿。无视这点也将导致灾难。改革的程序不能夺去大多数人的意愿。但这也不是照比例原则的。
泰国需要的是以非政党、民主的决心，组成一个真正的制定或修改宪法的国民代表大会。这就必须摈弃人民民主改革委员会中的极端份子，和死抓政权不放的旧体制力量，以便让路给制定1997年宪法所包涵的意愿。但支持达信的阵营也必须作出一个真正的选择 - 通过一个拥抱民主改革的步骤，厘清它真正的利害关系，并承诺遵守大家必须服从的新的政治模式与问责制。它不能一方面把自己打扮成民主的力量，而另一方面又不承认军人政变前达信政权往独裁漂移的现象。
原文刊载於12 MAY 2014 00:59《曼谷邮报》
作者：麦可•康纳斯〔Michael Connors〕任教於诺丁汉大学马来西亚学府，著有《泰国的民主与国家认同》〔Democracy and National Identity in Thailand〕(NIAS Press, 2007)。
译者：苏杭
[ 本帖最后由 苏杭 于 2022-6-8 09:49 编辑 ]
 图片附件:
thai democracy.jpg (43.16 K)
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〝自从2006年政变，泰国就缺乏一个可行的政治解决办法，双方都在爭取对自己有利的，因此暴力与仇恨加剧。内战之说以往常被当作无稽之谈，现在却是大有可能。双方的武装冲突迫在眉头，很可能孤注一掷，邀来军队的干预。〞
现在军人真的政变了。
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这是我在《曼谷邮报》找到的原文：
Real democratic voices need to be heard
PUBLISHED: 12 MAY 2014 AT 00:59
Another one bites the dust, so the great Queen song goes. With the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of Yingluck Shinawatra as caretaker prime ministers on Wednesday, Thailand has witnessed three pro-Thaksin prime ministers dust-bitten in six years, courtesy of judicial interventions. The very moment she was dismissed, the Pheu Thai Party promoted to prime minister Niwatthamrong Bunsongphaisan — a close associate of Thaksin Shinawatra — almost as if to line him up for the firing squad.
On cue, intellectuals behind the anti-government movement, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), announced that Mr Niwatthamrong could not be caretaker prime minister but only a deputy prime minister acting as a caretaker prime minister. This tendentious argument was meant to demonstrate that a political vacuum existed allowing for the creation of an interim government and a so-called People’s Council. May well the anti-Thaksin camp be singing Queen’s chorus line: “Hey I’m gonna get you too. Another one bites the dust”.
The dismissal of Ms Yingluck by the Constitutional Court is part of a conspiracy according to pro-government supporters. It is not. She knowingly transferred the head of the National Security Council, enabling her government to then transfer the sitting national police chief into the post, which then allowed Thaksin’s former brother-in-law to occupy the vacant post of national police chief. Nor is it right to call a conspiracy the indictment of Ms Yingluck on Thursday by the National Anti-Corruption Commission for negligence in regard to the failed rice subsidy scheme, about which warning signs were plenty. The indictment might prove to be wrong, but it is not a conspiracy.
There is no conspiracy in these judgments; they are faithful to the 2007 constitution that aimed to keep at bay the Shinawatra clan. It also buttressed a reactive alliance between the post-2006 revived military-bureaucratic establishment and the political class around the hybrid liberal-conservative Democrat Party against Thaksin. It didn’t work. Under the 2007 constitution pro-Thaksin parties won two elections (2007, 2011) only to be robbed of the 2014 February election by the Constitutional Court’s nullifying of the poll. That ruling made sense in the face of the PDRC’s vandalising blockades of the ballot.
There is no conspiracy because the independent agencies of state, including the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission and others function according to the 2007 constitution project. This included strengthening the hand of the judiciary and bureaucracy in the functioning of the independent agencies and the Senate, and peopling them with anti-Thaksin forces. With such instrumentalities the hope was that the demands of the Thaksin-aligned political class and its electoral base could be controlled — no conspiracy in the real meaning of the word is required, because these agencies are functioning to script.
This is not to say that the judgments are necessarily legitimate. The 2007 Constitution won quasi-legitimacy by a bare majority in a national referendum under the restrictive conditions of a military junta. Its real birth lay in the illegal seizure of power in the 2006 coup: an act forbidden in the criminal code and an act which was absolved, in time-honoured fashion, by the military junta in its interim constitution following the coup. Given their coup-dependency, the rule of law discourse in Thailand claimed by the anti-government elites as part a primary motivator against the caretaker government has a whiff of hypocrisy.
It also has an air of desperation. During the 1990s when a liberal conservative pact was formed and found expression in the 1997 constitution, the Democrat Party and civil society broadly did little to win the nation to new norms of political order that would have protected them against Thaksin’s electoral authoritarianism during the first half of the 2000s. Thaksin won the electoral argument by action and effective policy and party machine, and some monetary lubrication. But as a result of dictatorial shortcuts and manipulations by those who oppose him he has now emerged in many people’s eyes as at least an electocrat, if not a democrat.
There was hope that with appropriate groundwork Thaksin could return from exile. And so very deliberately, when the Yingluck government attempted constitutional reform late last year, it twinned-in-time that higher purpose of reform with a general amnesty that would have enabled a Thaksin return. And this brought out the gremlins — the political peace of her first two years of office fell apart.
Former secretary-general of the Democrat Party, Suthep Thaugsuban, and other high profile Democrats quit as party notables to take the fight to the streets and were then followed by Democrat Party MPs resigning en masse from parliament in December last year. The die was cast. Thailand’s oldest party with a sometimes honourable history of fighting dictatorship and promoting liberal forms of democracy, transformed itself into a street fighting outfit robbing the country of a chance of political compromise because it chose not to be a strong parliamentary opposition. And so the 2007 transparent political project, not a conspiracy, continues.
If there is no conspiracy there are certainly “double standards” in the various court cases pursued, and in the outcomes achieved. However, the charge of double-standards stands across the political divide because this is a tendency in both camps, evidenced by the way the instrumentalities under their respective control function.
The double standards — in play no matter who is in office — reflect an apparent intractability at two levels: first, between the rival elites who want to hold power, and second the political visions they espouse, and upon which they have attracted a mass base. The intractability, bad as it is, is also entangled in anxieties surrounding the issue of royal succession.
This weekend significant numbers of protesters from both sides are on the streets. The PDRC is seeking defection by state officials to its side and an interim government. Its occupation of television stations seeks to broadcast this intent. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) will be pushing for a July election and for the caretaker government to remain in office.
There is no chance of the former, some for the latter.
The UDD will say that the Constitutional Court is itself unconstitutional — arguing that it functions without any organic law. The 2007 constitution required that an organic law be promulgated within a year of its promulgation. No organic law exists and the court has been functioning under transitory provisions that reference its legitimacy to the coup constitution of 2006. One problem the UDD faces: there is no appeal against a Constitutional Court decision. So, it now takes to the streets to defend the government.
Since the 2006 coup Thailand has lacked a workable political settlement and as each side has manoeuvred for advantage, violence and hate have intensified. Talk of civil war used to be rhetoric, it is now a possibility. The strategic arms in both sides’ armory is narrowing — and it may come down to going for broke, inviting military intervention.
However, the proposals from both sides do not address the intractable nature of the conflict. An election right now seems like an invitation to hell. An election is not a forum to decide fundamental antagonisms on the nature of power. There is no point in the Pheu Thai caretaker administration seeking another democratic mandate. Indeed, winning elections in Thailand appears to be a case of diminishing returns.
The better option is to begin a national political reform process. But this can only begin on the basis of respecting the historic democratic will of the current caretaker government’s constituency, across several elections. To ignore this is also an invitation to hell. Reform processes cannot disenfranchise a majority. But this is not about proportionality.
A genuine constituent assembly, for that is what is needed, should form a democratic will, not a partisan one. This would require that extremist elements of the PDRC be abandoned, and the clinging to power of the old establishment should give way to the aspirations that were embedded in the 1997 constitution. But it also requires of the pro-Thaksin camp a real choice — to embrace democratic reform through a process that it has genuine stakes in and to commit to new modes of politics and accountability that all must be subject to. It cannot seek to present itself as a democratic force and not acknowledge the authoritarian drift of the pre-coup Thaksin administrations.
Michael Connors teaches at the University of Nottingham, Malaysia campus. He is the author of “Democracy and National Identity in Thailand” (NIAS Press, 2007).
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